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Abstract
The so-called Received View (RV) on quantum non-individuality
states, basically, that quantum particles are not individuals. It has
received an amount of criticism in the recent literature, most of it
concerning the relation between the RV and the relation of identity. In
this chapter we carefully characterise a family of concepts involved in
clarifying the view, indicating how the very idea of failure of identity,
commonly used to define the RV, may be understood. By doing so, we
hope to dissipate some misunderstandings about the RV, which shall
also be seen as evidence of its tenability.
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“I am the same electron that spoke to you before.”
“You cannot be!” exclaimed Alice.
“I saw that electron go off in a different direction.
Perhaps he was not the same one I was talking to
before?”
“Certainly he was.”
“Then you cannot be the same one,” said Alice rea-
sonably.
“You cannot both be the same one you know.”
“Oh yes we can!” replied the electron.
“He is the same. I am the same. We are all the same,
you know, exactly the same!”
“That is ridiculous,” argued Alice.
“You are here beside me, while he has run off some-
where over there, so you cannot both be the same
person. One of you must be different.”
“Not at all,” cried the electron, jumping up and down
even faster in its excitement.
“We are all identical; there is no way whatsoever that
you can tell us apart, so you see that he must be the
same and I am the same too.”
Robert Gilmore, Alice in the Quantumland [Gi.95,
p.30]
1 Introduction
The Received View (RV) on quantum particles’ non-individuality says that
quantum objects are non-individuals of some sort (see [FK.06] and the ref-
erences therein; see also [A.17] for further discussion). As an attempt to
characterise the view, it does not say anything very specific, given that all
it is doing is to deny that quantum particles are individuals. It provides,
however, a kind of recipe for versions of the RV, which get their meaning
depending on how one frames the details concerning individuality and lack
thereof. In the absence of a precise understanding of what individuality
means, and how something may fail to be an individual, this leaves a lot
of space for misunderstanding, and the aim of this paper is to explain how
much of the potential criticism to the RV may be properly dealt with.
Addressing such criticism will require that we clearly characterise the
RV. Instead of defending one particular approach to the RV (it may be
characterised in distinct terms, see [A.17]), we shall approach the core con-
cepts involved in articulating the view, and show that a proper understand-
ing of them will work perfectly well to dispel some of the doubts that are
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constantly surrounding it. This shall also be a nice opportunity to discuss
some methodological points on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics re-
lated to the RV, and which have only appeared thanks to discussions on
the RV. We shall suggest, in the end, that quantum mechanics indicates
non-individuality as a natural company for the theory, despite the current
criticism to the view.
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we make an
overview of core metaphysical and logical concepts involved in articulating
the RV. These concepts are those that are typically called forth also in
criticisms of the RV, so, a proper understanding of them is important if one
is to address the RV properly. In section 3 we attempt to bring to light some
of such confusions, and how the proper treatment of the concepts may avoid
them, or suggest alternative roads to dealing with these concepts, mainly
when issues concerning isolation of quanta are involved. Next, in section 4,
we describe CTI, the classical theory of identity in order to see what it entails
and why it brings problems for the RV, given its most common formulation
related to the denial of identity for some entities. In section 5 we discuss
the famous analogy of the money in a bank account, which has both been
used to advance the RV, and to criticise it in more recent literature. Finally,
in section 6 we present the main outlines of quasi-set theory, a theory that
codifies some of the basic claims of the RV, and grounds our claim that
identity may be associated with individuality, and may be dispensed with
for some entities (quantum non-individuals, of course!). A brief comment on
multisets and on fuzzy sets is given for comparison. We conclude in section
7, with a small coda on metaphysical theory choice in the specific case of
quantum mechanics and theories of individuality.
2 Some of the background concepts to the RV
From a metaphysical point of view, the first notion that one must grasp
in order to make sense of the RV is the notion of an individual. Non-
individuals, in the sense advanced by the RV, are neither individuals nor
universals or non-particular items. Rather, they are traditionally thought of
as particulars lacking a principle of individuality. Obviously, this does not
mean that the RV suggests that everything is not an individual: the claim,
again, is that quantum particles are not individuals.1
1Certainly, one could claim that other kinds of entities, such as clouds, may not be
individuals. However, in this paper we shall confine ourselves to non-individuals in quan-
tum mechanics, given that one may see the theory itself as providing us reasons to believe
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‘Individual’ is a technical term in metaphysics (see Lowe [Lw.03] for a
discussion of the standard approaches to individuality). Usually, in saying
that something is an individual, philosophers use to point to some principle
of individuality and say that, since something obeys such a principle, that
is, once this something ‘has individuality’, it is an individual. As we shall
see, there are further things to consider.2 The fact is that there is not a
clear consensus on what ‘individual’ means exactly, given that distinct ri-
val proposals have been advanced on what should count as an individuality
principle, and the debate on the metaphysical principle of individuality is
still alive (as other metaphysical debates). The target notion that one tries
to characterise by a principle of individuality is the idea of one unity of a
given kind (a chair, a car, a person, a horse, etc.), with the principle sin-
gling out that particular individual as distinct from any other individual of
the same kind. An individual, then, is a particular item satisfying such a
principle, and so that it may have properties and can enter in relations with
other individuals. Given that a principle of individuality also accounts for
the differences between individuals, they can be counted in the traditional
sense, meaning that given a finite collection of them,3 we may apply the
classical definition of counting, which requires that we define a one-to-one
function from the set they form with a unique finite ordinal (in von Neu-
mann’s sense). They may bear names and, importantly, these names act as
rigid designators, meaning that the individuals can (in principle) be referred
to (for instance, by their unambiguous names) as such in different contexts.
In this sense, the metaphysical concept of individuality requires, for its for-
mulation and application, a close connection with the concept of identity
(see also Bueno [Bu.14]).
This general notion of individuality has been developed in distinct di-
rections, giving rise to distinct theories of individuality. In broad terms,
two rival approaches are the Leibnizian qualitative approach to individual-
ity, grounding the individuality in terms of the qualities the individual has,
and the so-called Transcendental Individuality approach, which grounds the
individuality in terms of some non-qualitative ingredient (see French and
Krause [FK.06, chap.1]; see also Benovsky [Be.16] for doubts on the rivalry
between the views). The Leibnizian approach frames individuality exclu-
sively in terms of the qualitative properties instantiated by a particular; ba-
sically, one individual’s individuality is completely characterised by the fact
that such entities lack individuality.
2More specifically, we shall point to the necessity of distinguishing among three usually
fundamental notions, namely, identity, individuality, and individuation.
3In this discussion, we consider only finite collections.
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that each individual is unique on what concerns the collection of qualities
it possesses or instantiates. The uniqueness in case is achieved by endorse-
ment of the famous Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles
(PII), which states that there are no two absolutely indiscernible things: the
agreement in all properties requires that there is numerical uniqueness, and
so complete characterisation by collection of properties counts as a principle
of individuality.
Of course, one could doubt the underlying idea that a qualitative descrip-
tion of an individual can be uniquely attributed to a single individual, so
that it would be possible for two individuals to share every property, failing
the PII. In this case, qualitative identity would not be enough for numer-
ical identity, and the principle of individuality would have to be provided
by something transcending the qualities of the individuals. This approach
requires that there exists something beyond the properties of an individual
that makes it the individual it is, and so the principle of individuality would
be based on the existence of some form of substratum (a particular ingre-
dient added to the characterisation of the individual and which confers it
its individuality), a haecceity (a non-qualitative property instantiated solely
by the individual it characterises), or whatever metaphysical posit that can
work for those purposes; philosophers, following Heinz Post, call this strat-
egy the ‘transcendental individuality’ approach ([RT.91], [FK.06, chap.1]).
Classical physics is compatible with both approaches. It assumes Max-
well-Boltzmann statistics, where permutations of qualitatively indiscernible
things (like two electrons) lead to different states. So, although they can
be in principle indiscernible by their qualities, the particles have something
granting them individuality, and it is suggested that it is their individuality
which operates on the background to account for the difference of the states
before and after the permutation (given that no quality of the particles could
do that in such cases). A Leibnizian may account for that by appealing
to the Impenetrability Principle, which grants a unique spatial location to
any particle; in this case, the notion of quality allowed by the Leibnizian
must be extended to allow for spatial locations to be seen as a quality and
act as a principle of individuality. Transcendental Individuality approaches
needs no such appeal to spatial location as a special quality, given that
they already posit something transcending every quality and relation an
object may have. In this sense, the metaphysics of individuality in classical
mechanics gets underdetermined by classical physics (see French and Krause
[FK.06, chap.2]).
That accounts for the metaphysical concept of individuality. Notice that
by advancing a principle of individuality, one has answered the metaphysi-
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cal question of individuality: what is it that makes an individual precisely
the individual it is? Qualitative and non-qualitative approaches advance
specific answers to that. A major difference in these approaches concerns
how they allow one to address a different concern about entity identification.
Qualitative approaches to individuality, by framing individuality in terms of
qualities, allow that, at least in principle, we uniquely identify an individual
as the one having such and such properties. Given that these approaches as-
sume that an individual is uniquely characterised by its qualities, this can be
done, again, at least in principle. Non-qualitative principles cannot do that,
i.e. ground identification claims on individuality, given their assumption
that distinct individuals may be qualitatively identical. This epistemic act
of singling out an entity as the object of our sensory attention or reference
is what we shall call individuation.
Individuality and identification have a close relationship with another
important concept, which also features in discussions of these issues in the
literature and on the RV: identity. What it is meant by ‘identity’? This is
a perennial philosophical question. Philosophers of physics, as philosophers
in general (in particular the critics of the RV), assume some informal (and
quite vague) notion of numerical identity: individuals a and b are identical
(we write a = b) if and only if there are no two individuals at all, but just
one, which can be referred to indifferently by either a or b. Systems of logic
attempt to bring systematic clarity to the relation of identity, although con-
troversy appears here too (for instance, in the resulting distinctions between
first-order versus second-order versions in classical logic, and necessary or
contingent identity in modal logic, to mention just two). The relation is
important for us because it has been frequently used to characterise non-
individuals: it is typically advanced that a non-individual is an entity for
which identity does not apply. That is, non-individuals are entities for which
identity, in the sense of numerical identity, does not hold. But what is the
relation between such failure of identity and failure of individuality?
According to some forerunners of quantum physics, quantum particles
cannot be seen as individuals, understood as entities with well defined
identity conditions (the story can be seen in [FK.06, chap.3]; but see also
[ABK.19]). Then, they would be non-individuals in this sense, of lacking
anything that makes them precisely the individual they are, there is no such
ingredient available for a quantum particle. This was taken seriously by the
most well-developed version of the RV. The most well-known approaches
to the RV (as advanced in [FK.06]) intends to understand and to analyse
formally the lack of individuality as a failure of the notion of identity when
applied to certain entities. According to the RV, then, the very notion of
6
identity would not be applicable to all objects. Formally, expressions like
a = b, for a and b terms designating specific objects (quantum entities),
would not be well-formed, and so the language would be unable to express
their identity (or difference). But, as the reader may be wondering, even so
they could have identity, since this could be just a lack of expressive capacity
of the language, so being an epistemological limitation. As we shall show
below, this can be accepted as being the case, if we use classical logic in the
metamathematics, a fact that most critics of the RV don’t take notice of.4 It
was precisely this question that motivated the development of an alternative
framework for semantic considerations, so that a = b (or a 6= b) could not be
proven even in the metamathematics, namely, the so-called quasi-set theory,
to be mentioned below (see also Arenhart [A.14]).
The very idea that a formal background is always called forth is a must in
these discussions. It puts the desirable order on a metaphysically important
concept, and allows us to make a better sense of what it would mean for
something to lack such concepts, or for such concepts to fail to apply. This
can be understood in diverse ways, and the proper formalisation helps us
keeping track of what is being advanced and what is not allowed. The first
thing to be acknowledged is that this metaphysical notion of identity cannot
be properly captured by a first-order formal system [H.83] (see also [KA.18],
specially p.287). Even so, we still must count with some theory of identity,
and usually we choose the theory ascribed by classical logic and standard
mathematics, as we shall see below.
Remark Of course, identity and its relation to individuality demands a
further discussion. So far, we have said that traditionally, non-individuality
has been framed as a kind of lack of identity. That brings with it further
questions concerning identity that shall not concern us here. We can say
that Dr. Jekyll has an identity when he is Dr. Jekyll, but loses his identity
when he becomes Mr. Hyde and vice-versa. In psychology, we know related
cases of people who have different personalities in different times. All of this
is relevant for the discussion of identity, but we are not discussing identity
in time (transtemporal identity). Anyway, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hide are
the same person, although assuming different personalities. We assume that
individuals present genidentity, as in standard physics, in the sense of being
able to be re-identifyed as such in other contexts.
Furthermore, non-individuals obey permutation laws, such as the Indis-
4Really, they always presuppose classical logic and a standard set theory, encompassing
the classical theory of identity (CTI) to be seen soon.
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tinguishability Postulate (see [RT.91], French and Krause [FK.06, chap.4]),
which roughly says that a permutation of non-individuals (better: permu-
tations of non-indivividuals’ labels) does not conduce to a different state of
affairs. They cannot be counted in the standard sense, put in some order in
the standard sense, for they do not have identity. We end up not being able
to define a one-to-one function from a set of such entities to a finite ordinal,
for to which non-individual we should ascribe the number 2 if they cannot
be identified? Anyway, their collections may have a cardinal, for in many
cases we refer to ‘six electrons so and so’, ‘two quarks up’, and so on. These
features of a non-individual must be taken into account into any version of
the RV.
3 Confusions involving individuality and individ-
uation
The RV is accused of not reflecting present day physics, since in some situ-
ations particles can be isolated, hence, according to some critics, presenting
identity and individuality, while the RV says that such entities do not present
identity conditions. This is a conclusion that mixes the different concepts
of identity, individuality, and individuation.5 So, before we address directly
the problems that identity may be seen as raising in connection to the RV,
and some of the criticism associated with it, it will be useful to consider
some of the confusions that a conflation of individuality and individuation
have caused to the RV. Our claim is that once these concepts are properly
understood, as we suggested in the previous section, no difficulty appears
for the RV (see also [KA.18]).
Non-individuals lack individuality, but they need not lack individuation
conditions (recall the difference, as stated in the previous section). That is,
some non-individuals may be identified, in the epistemic sense of individu-
ation, and still not derive any principle of individuality in the metaphysical
sense from such an identification. The fact that a positron, for instance, is
trapped in the laboratory does not entail that we have a well defined princi-
ple of individuality in our metaphysical pantheon. The situation is perfectly
the same if the particle is taken to be a non-individual.
Part of the criticisms to the RV come, we guess, from a misunderstanding
of which of these characteristics a non-individual lacks. Non-individuals can
certainly be isolated (as a positron in a trap), taken as one of a kind (one
5These notions were already differentiated in [KA.18].
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electron), bear properties (electrons have a certain mass, a specific electric
charge, and so on), may enter in relations with other non-individuals (to
have spin opposite to) and with individuals, but still fail to have other
characteristics. For instance, they cannot always be re-identified as such
from context to context. An electron released from an atom by a process
of ionisation cannot be ever recognised again; one cannot hope to find an
electron at a later time and say: ‘that is exactly the electron that was
released before’. So, a given name (as ‘Priscilla’) does not act as a rigid
designator, and cannot be used to identify the positron as that positron
that was trapped one day (see below).
Individuation is an epistemological notion, and it is closely related to the
notion of isolation; we isolate an entity for some purposes. Going directly
to our case study, we may say that a certain quantum object (a positron
called Priscilla [De.89], a barium atom called Astrid [De.89], a strontium
atom [Z.18], etc.) is individuated, or isolated by some trapping device.6 Of
course the asymmetries of the laboratory provide the means for us to provide
individuation for the trapped quantum, but not necessarily an individuality,
in the sense that it also confers the metaphysical explanation of what the
entity is. It is simply isolated. But some physicists say that due to this
situation, the trapped entity acquires an identity card, or something like
individuality. Does it?
From our previous discussion on individuality, the conclusion just doesn’t
follow. Isolating an entity does not confer to it individuality in the sense
that we would be able to say that due to the isolation, we have a principle of
individuality, not even in qualitative approaches to individuality. Basically,
to be trapped in a quantum trap, if quantum entities are individuals, the
principle of individuality must be already operating (the individual must
exist as an individual before it gets trapped). The trap cannot operate as
a temporary individuating principle, in any metaphysically robust sense.
There is no such thing. The particle does not become the particle it is,
different from any other, just because it is inside a trap. In other words:
the fact of being trapped does not answer the concerns a principle of indi-
viduality should answer. Even more: trapping is just temporary, so that, if
it could confer individuality to a particle, this individuality would be tem-
porary too. That doesn’t make sense for individuals. Julius Caesar was
6Hans Dehmelt won the Nobel Prize of 1989 for trapping quanta, and the same hap-
pened with Serge Haroche and David Wineland in 2012. But, as we have argued in [K.11],
these experiments neither confer to the trapped quanta a status of individuals, nor nec-
essarily confer them identity. See below. Notice that we have avoided to use the article
‘the’, preferring to speak of a positron, a barium atom, a strontium atom.
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not Julius Caesar in the working days and Pompey in the weekends. While
existing, he was Julius Caesar all the time, even if sometimes used a fantasy
to avoid being recognised. But even in this case he was Julius Caesar, and
if he fought against Vercingetorix, it was Julius Caesar who did it, and not
Pompey.
From the perspective of the distinction presented in the previous section,
quantum objects, when trapped, instantiate what Toraldo di Francia called
a mock individuality (we could add that they also have a mock identity), a
term Dennis Dieks considers ‘disparaging’ [D.20]. This believe is due, we
guess, to the (again) confusion among identity, individuality, and individu-
ation (isolation). The trapped quantum object is isolated by the trap, and
there is a condition of individuation operating on the background, namely,
the possibility for us to say that that object in the trap is a quantum object
of a specific kind, a positron say. But it can (by hypothesis) leave the trap,
and get mixed with other objects of the same kind. In this case, even the
mock individuality is lost. That means that the trap does not confer individ-
uality to the trapped particle, but only a temporary individuation condition
provided by the condition of the laboratory apparatus. That cannot hap-
pen to individuality. When Julius Caesar entered the Battle of Pharsalus
(against Pompey), he didn’t lose his identity; even if one could not identify
him in the battle field, he is an individual. His identity does not depend
on our ability to single him out in the middle of other persons. Quanta do
not have identity and lack a principle of individuality, although they may
be singled out (isolated) sometimes.
Dieks made also a criticism to the interpretation given in [K.11] according
to which the trapped positron Priscilla could be substituted by any other
positron of the universe and the measured results would be exactly the
same. But it seems that this is precisely what happens to quantum objects
in general! Of course Priscilla is that positron in Dehmelt’s trap, while it
is there, but the argumentation in [K.11] goes further, in supposing that
during the night, when Dehmelt is at home, a malignant enemy destroys the
experiment. But, moments later, the cordial caretaker, who saw Dehmelt
making thousand of experiments of trapping positrons, until he decided
to fix in one of them to call it ‘Priscilla’ (any other could in principle do
the job as well, something that could not occur with individuals due to
their differences), makes the experiment again just to please the Professor,
trapping a positron (we can never come even close to establish that it is
Priscilla again). Well, in the morning we shall have a positron in the trap,
and Dehmelt, arriving at the lab, can say, as he does every day just for fun:
‘Good morning, Priscilla’. Well, neither Dehmelt nor Dieks could say that
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that positron is not the Priscilla of the day before without knowing what
has happened. It is completely different if one day, during the time Julius
Caesar remained captured by pirates, early in the morning there arrives at
the deck not Julius Caesar, but Pompey. That’s the difference! Priscilla has
not identity, but Julius Caesar does (so tells us our preferred metaphysics).
4 The classical theory of identity and its conse-
quences
Roughly speaking, identity is a logical notion, while, let us recall, individu-
ality is a metaphysical notion and individuation is an epistemological one.
We have a prima facie informal attempt at a characterisation of identity
when we say that an object is identical just to itself and to nothing else.
This metaphysical identity (or numerical identity) cannot be formalised in
first-order languages, as mentioned above, and such an intuitive and redun-
dant concept is not useful at all in dealing with foundational questions, yet
sometimes it can be used for doing physics at a certain limit.7 So, we need
to restrict ourselves to the theories we can develop regarding the concept of
identity, and there is not one sole way to consider this concept.8 In other
words, we need to make use of some logical system, and identity becomes
relative to it, something (to our knowledge) almost never considered by
philosophers of physics, who quite always work with the intuitive notion,
thinking that it can be applied to everything. Thus, it is interesting to see
what we have from the logical point of view if we adopt, as most physical
theories do, classical logic as the underlying mathematical apparatus. This
leads us to the CTI, the ‘classical theory of identity’ to be described now,
and to its consequences for the RV.
The central point in our argumentation concerning logic and mathemat-
ics is related to the fact that such apparatuses are used to express quantum
mechanics; as we shall see, any physical theory is grounded on a logic and
on a mathematics, usually taken to be that one which can be expressed in
a theory of sets such as the ZFC system.
7Concerning mathematics, it was mainly in the XIXth century that the need for preci-
sion of concepts was seen as necessary; as is well known, logic grew up with such a move.
Perhaps it is time for the philosophy of physics to pay attention to the underlying logic
of the physical theories.
8We can recall Geach’s relative identity, where we consider always a being identical
to b relative to some sortal predicate P (see [N.15]), Hilbert and Bernays’ definition of
identity assumed by Quine, as a kind of indiscernibility relation by all the (finitely many)
predicates of the language [Q.86].
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Within ZFC, if we are going to represent the idea of a lack of identity,
the best we can do is to ‘veil’ the identity of some objects, say by confining
them within an equivalence class or, in a most general situation, within a
deformable (non-rigid) structure. But this is a trick; we are just not ‘seeing’
them as distinct, but they are individuals in the end.9
The defence we do of the RV is not to be taken as dogmatic. We are
aware that there are alternatives, and nothing more than pragmatic criteria
can be used to chose among these alternatives. But we are yet not convinced
that the RV is not the better one to consider the very nature of the ‘particles’
in quantum theories.
The first is the underlying theory of identity, which we term the Classical
Theory of Identity (CTI). If the binary symbol ‘=’ is a primitive logical
symbol of our language, the postulates of CTI are:
(Reflexivity) ∀x(x = x)
(Substitutivity) x = y → (α(x)→ α(y)), where α() is a formula where x
appears free and α(y) is got from the previous one by substituting x for
y in some free occurrences of y and y is a variable distinct from x.
(Extensionality-1) ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y, in the case of ‘pure’ sets
(without ur-elements), or
(Extensionality-2) ∀z(z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) ∨ ∀z(x ∈ z ↔∈ z) → x = y if the
theory encompasses ur-elements.
The converses of last two follow from Substitutivity. Let us consider
a universe of sets. As a first order theory, ZFC (supposed consistent) has
infinitely many models of different cardinalities; it is not categorical. Let
us fix in von Neumann’s well-founded universe V = 〈V,∈〉, where ∈ is the
membership relation and V is the cumulative hierarchy of sets (either com-
prising ur-elements or not). Of course V is not a ZFC-set, that is, a set
whose existence is obtained from the axioms of the theory; it is a proper
class. But, in the metamathematics, it can be seen as a structure and the
9A deformable structure has automorphisms other than the identity function. Two
elements a and b of the domain of the structure are indiscernible (relative to the structure)
if and only if there is an automorphism h of the structure such that h(a) = b. It can
be proven [Je.03, p.66] that the standard universe of sets is rigid, meaning that its only
automorphism is the identity function — which entails that an object whatever represented
in such a framework is indiscernible only from itself. For details, see [FK.06, chap.7].
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following theorem can be proven [Je.03, pp.66-7]: in V, there are no non-
trivial automorphisms. This means that the structure is rigid, and that the
only object indiscernible from an element a of the domain is a itself.
Really, given a, we need to acknowledge that the singleton {a} can be
formed (by the pair axiom); thus define the predicate Ia(x) := x ∈ {a}.
Then it is easy to see that only a obeys this monadic predicate, hence being
distinct from any ‘other’ object, that is, any object that doesn’t obey Ia.
Some philosophers prefer to say that quantum objects, although they
cannot be absolutely discernible (discernible by a monadic property), can
be weakly discernible (see [MS.08], [DV.08]). CTI and the predicate Ia
show that this is a mistake. The language we use in developing quantum
mechanics, even if it is not confined to predicates of the theory, ends up
getting in the way of establishing identity and discernibility. By ‘weakly
indiscernible’ we mean that objects a and b obey an irreflexive and symmetric
relation (in the case of quantum objects, the two electrons of an Helium atom
in its fundamental state for instance, consider the relation ‘to have the spin
in the same direction of’), and by being only weakly indiscernible, we mean
that they cannot be distinguished absolutely. As shown in the previous
paragraph, the monadic predicate Ia distinguishes a from any other object
of the universe. So, in ZFC, there are not just weakly indiscernible things,
and this applies to quanta once we ground our mathematics in such a set
theory.
5 The money in a bank account analogy
In discussing the individuality of quantum objects, Schro¨dinger made a com-
parison of the metaphysical character of non-individuals with a case of an
amount of money in a bank account [S.98]. According to him, if we have,
(say) ¤2 in a bank account, there is no sense in asking for our particular
euros; no single ¤2 coin is the one that we could say is our euro coin cur-
rently in the account. His conclusion is that the euros in a bank account
are behaving as not individuals, at least for the purposes of attribution of
a quantity of euros for a given client of the bank. This would be so with
quantum entities too: only the amount of them (and their species) would
be relevant for the purposes of an adequate quantum description (that is,
for a description of a state according to quantum mechanics). For quan-
tum mechanical purposes, that is, all that matters is the kind of the entities
involved and their quantity, not which of them are being used.
In analysing this problem, Dennis Dieks says that
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more than one money units in a bank account is the standard
example of the absence of individuality ; it is a case in which only
the account itself, with the total amount of money in it, can be
treated as possessing individuality. (our emphasis) [D.14, p.53]
We have emphasised the word ‘individuality’ to call the attention, again,
to the (pace, Dennis) confusion among identity, individuality and individu-
ation. If I have just one euro in my account, then of course there needs still
be no individuality here in the form of a principle of individuality, but indi-
viduation can be considered, since we can say that that euro in my account
is mine. But what lacks here is identity. Since any transference between
two accounts can be done, we cannot even more identify ‘my’ euro if it is
deposited in another account with more euros there.
Situations like these ones, where quantity matters, but individuality and
identity do not, are precisely what the theory of quasi-sets captures. But,
before seeing how this can be done, let us remark that if the analogy is to
be put within a standard language such as the language of ZFC, we can
ask: is the collection of the euros in our account a set? Remember that, by
hypothesis, we are developing our physical theory as having classical logic
(meaning ZFC) as its underlying logic. So, everything is either a set or
an ur-element (if there are any) in this context. Whatever the answer, the
money in a bank account ends up having a kind of individuality, as related
to the classical theory of identity, which we have briefly discussed before.
Even if that is clear enough, some, such as Dieks, suggest that to resort
to ZFC in this discussion would be “an extraordinary and highly artificial
measure” [D.20]. He goes on and says that bankers and clients need only
classical logic and set theory, and that even withing such a framework we
can reason as if there are discrete sums in the account and this does not
imply that there are individual euros in it. We don’t agree. If bankers and
clients don’t want to identify their particular euros while they are in their
accounts, ZFC is just what they shouldn’t use!
Really, the hypothesis that there are no individual euros in the account
presupposes that one is ignoring the mandatory postulates of ZFC. Of course
bankers and clients don’t use formal ZFC, and we cannot sustain this view,
for they certainly do not even think about shifting to a formal system of set
theory to deal with their money. They reason intuitively as if the particular
euros could not be identified and had no specific individuality when they
make financial operations on them. But whenever one tries to formalise this
operation, one will surely find that we need to consider the euros as forming
a set of euros, and then their identity enters by the backdoor. Dieks still
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refers to the fact that sometimes certain amounts of money can acquire
identity, for instance when we have just ¤1 in our account. This case is
completely similar to the situation involving trapped quanta. You can call
‘Priscilla’ your euro, and the same remarks made above apply also here.
Specifically with the money case, what we can do (say, to buy a caramel)
with one euro, we can do with any other one, taken from a different account
named by another person (which, by hypothesis, does have identity). They
will acquire identity only when you go to the bank and get it in the cash;
then you can say ‘This one is my euro’, and it is different from any other one
in the world. But now you are speaking of a particular piece of paper, and
not of the euro as it act in finances. No, even one euro is not an individual
in the sense we use this word when only financial operations are involved,
and few people who discuss this subject says what they understand by an
individual or by ‘having identity’, Dieks included.
As the previous discussion makes it clear, the money in a bank account
is an analogy. From the point of view of the uses of money and for financial
purposes, amounts of money are not individuals. They may be permuted
without any loss of their functions. There is no specific financial transaction
that can be done with one coin of ¤2 that cannot be done also with another
coin. So, from this point of view, they have no individuality. Certainly,
one can provide identification for money, by describing amounts of money
relatively to well-identified objects, such as ‘the ¤2 coin in my left pocket’,
or even ‘the coins in my safe’. This provides for identification, but not for
individuality, if are considering only the financial operations. However, that
is not the only perspective from which coins and money in general can be
seen. As macroscopic objects, they may be treated as physical systems.
That guarantees, in particular, that each single coin has a specific position
in space, so that it gets individuality, from that point of view, as a physical
object. Certainly, in ordinary circumstances we do not keep separating
contexts, such as those involving financial operations, and those involving
physical objects. But again, the point of the analogy was that, when we
restrict ourselves to a given kind of description of given objects, they may
be seen as non-individuals.
What happens in quantum mechanics is that, differently from money in
a bank account, where one also has (classical) physical description available,
our access to quantum entities is granted exclusively by quantum mechanics.
One just cannot see quantum particles as also classical objects, in the sense
that such objects could also be described by classical physics; the best we can
have is some occasions of identification, but that does not grant individuality,
as we have already discussed. Being quantum objects, and granting that the
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quantum description does not allow for any kind of natural individuality
principle (no Leibnizian principle, given the permutation symmetry, and
assuming that Transcendental Individuality is a philosophical posit, not a
quantum mechanical one), the kind of operation of granting individuality
through other means, such as happens in the case of the money, is lost.
From a quantum mechanical perspective, it is as if we only had the financial
description of the coins.
Quasi-set theory does the job quite nicely by considering non-individuals
within the Received View. Let us see how.
6 Quasi-sets, an intuitive view
Let us provide a general view on quasi-sets (qsets); details can be seen in
[FK.06, chap.7], [FK.10]. Quasi-sets are collections of objects some of which
may lack standard identity conditions or, better saying, the CTI doesn’t ap-
ply to them. Other objects may obey CTI, and are called ‘classical objects’
in the theory. Quasi-sets with only classical elements are sets, and in this
case the theory reduces to a standard set theory. There are two kinds of
atoms (ur-elements), but of course we can enlarge the theory to admit more;
the atoms are divided in two kinds, m-atoms, which play the role of quan-
tum entities, and the M -atoms, which play a role similar to the ur-elements
of ZFU, the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with ur-elements. The logical vo-
cabulary is standard of classical first-order logic, but no primitive identity
sign is assumed. Instead of identity, the language has as primitive a binary
predicate ‘≡’ for indistinguishability, or indiscernibility, which has the prop-
erties of an equivalence relation (but it does not obey full substitutivity).
A concept of extensional identity (or just ‘identity’ for short) is defined:
x = y holds for M -atoms belonging to the same qsets or to qsets having
the same elements. But notice that since the standard identity doesn’t hold
for m-atoms, we cannot suggest an exercise of verifying if a certain m-atom
belongs to a certain qset. This is as if you would like to know if a certain
quark (suppose you can think of it, say the only down quark in an Hydro-
gen atom) is or not that quark of one of the Hydrogen atoms of a water
molecule.10
Although we cannot assert which m-atoms are the specific elements of
a qset, we may reason as if there are some, and then the notion of cardinal
10Notice the difficulty in trying to give such an example; of which specific water molecule
we are speaking about? Of which Hydrogen atom? This difficulty reinforces the idea that
these entities do not have a well defined identity.
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applies also here. A Hydrogen atom has one proton and one electron, but
no one will ask which ones. We can think of such an atom as a qset whose
cardinal is 2 and whose elements form sub-qsets of cardinality one. The
theory proves that, given a certain m-atom, there exists a qset with cardinal
one whose only element is indistinguishable from the given element. But we
cannot prove that the element is that given element for the proof relies on
identity. But this enables us to speak, say, of the only electron in the outer
shell of a Sodium atom without the consequences of being able to identify it
as if we were within a standard framework. Really, suppose we are in ZFC.
Then we should regard the electrons of a Sodium atom as a set with 11
elements, and all of them would be discernible (due to CTI), in particular
the electron in the outer shell. In the quasi-set theory, we can reason as
we do with the two electrons of an Helium atom (a most common example)
in the fundamental state: we know that there are two and that they differ
by their spins in a given direction, but we cannot tell which is which. The
same with the Sodium atom: there is just one electron in the 3s shell, but
nothing tells us which electron is it.
Quasi-set theory describes quite nicely the statistics. As already shown
in [KSV.99], [FK.06, chap.7], in considering indiscernible m-atoms we arrive
‘directly’ to quantum statistics without the (standard) necessary ad hoc
assumption that the quanta of the same kind are indiscernible; remember
that we have started with such an hypothesis as a metaphysical assumption.
So, the Indistinguishability Postulate is not necessary.11
An important remark is in order. One of the most subtle criticism to
the theory is that, in its own formulation, identity is assumed [Bu.14]. Our
answer is as follows (details in [KA.19]). Some paraconsistent logics violate
the Principle of Non-Contradiction, accepting that α∧¬α (for some α) can
be true sometimes (in these logics, the explosion principle α∧¬α→ β does
not hold). But in describing such logics, we do not violate such a principle.
Really, we never think that something can simultaneously be a formula and
not be a formula, so as that the symbol ‘¬’ stands for negation but also does
not. Classical logic holds in the metalanguage, and so it does in the case of
quasi-sets. Identity holds when one is developing the formal system of quasi-
set theory. The theory used to construct and develop a formal system needs
not share the same principles the theory in the object level requires. For
11Perhaps something more should be added here. There is a difference, a fundamental
one according to our concerns, in which we start with some metaphysical thesis we either
believe or wish to investigate (our case) on the one hand, and to make an ad hoc hypothesis
after the ship having left the port (the introduction of the Indistinguishability Postulate),
on the other.
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the purposes of developing formal systems, a constructive logic is enough.
That does not mean that the object level system needs to be constructive.
Something similar holds for systems restricting identity; although at the
metalevel we need identity, the target to be investigated with the object
system is circumstances where the laws of identity do not apply, and this is
a different domain.
A (finite)12 quasi-set (qset) can be seen as a tuple
q = 〈k1, . . . , kn;λ1, . . . , λn〉, (1)
where the ki indicate the ‘kinds’ of the elements of the qset, while λi the
cardinality of the kind ki; the theory shows how to associate cardinals to
quasi-sets. For instance, the Helium-3 isotope, for certain purposes, can be
written as
He3 = 〈p, n, e; 2, 1, 2〉, (2)
with p, n and e standing for ‘protons’, ‘neutrons’ and ‘electrons’ respectively,
and the cardinals indicating the quantities of each one. This intuitively
means that we have two protons, two electrons, and one neutron, and this
takes not only these entities as indiscernible but two He3 atoms as well. The
case with just one euro is similar:
E = 〈euro, 1〉 (3)
says that we have just one euro, without identifying it. A qset with such
characteristics is called a strong singleton, expressing one unity of a kind,
without identification of the element (to see how this is possible, please see
[FK.06, p.]).13
This kind of apparatus may provide for an interesting alternative to
situations where ZFC is used. We do not mean by that that ZFC should be
substituted or that it is wrong; rather, our claim is that for a specific purpose
of dealing with quanta, perhaps, when the non-standard form of metaphysics
we are advancing here is taken into account, then, an alternative system is
more appropriate. For classical mathematics, however, ZFC is still more
appropriate, and, as we have mentioned, qsets recover classical set theory
when only classical objects are involved. The kinds of quanta, that is, the
differences among quanta of the ki species are given by the physical theory
12Finite quasi-sets apparently are enough for the relevant applications we have in mind.
13See Section (6.1) below a comment about multisets.
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and it is not a logical task to provide such a thing. Dieks and Versteegh say
that “there are no euros independently of account numbers, and possessing
definite values” [DV.08], also mentioned in [D.20]. We think differently:
without euros (or other currency), there cannot exist euros in accounts, and
even the concept of a bank account would lose its meaning. Things come
first, even if only in a metaphysical sense.14
One of the most important effects of the development of a quasi-set the-
ory, we believe, concerns a discussion on methodology of metaphysics of
quantum mechanics. Given a claim that some entities may exist without
individuality, and that this also means not having identity, the theory al-
lows us to formulate it in precise terms, and to recover important results
of quantum mechanics (see [KA.16], where it is shown that for technical
purposes, a version of the theory is recovered in quasi-set theory, using the
specific resources of the theory). Most objections to the RV concern the
informal use of concepts like identity and cardinality. It is typically claimed
(as by Dorato and Morganti [DoM.13], and by Jantzen [J.11], for instance)
that the concept of cardinality, the very idea of having a specific number
of entities in a given circumstance, implies identity, even if only in a thin
sense. Dorato and Morganti [DoM.13, p.606]
one could maintain that the ‘presence’ of n particles at the for-
mal level has a direct ontological counterpart, so that it can be
concluded that those particles are n individuals independently of
their qualities. After all, if the fact that a given physical sys-
tem is composed of a certain number of particles in a purely
formal sense is fundamental for even starting to show that the
entities composing the system are discernible, it seems perfectly
legitimate to regard quantum particles as (‘lowdegree’) individ-
uals by moving from a purely formal to a non-formal reading
of countability, without caring about qualitative properties and
(in)discernibility.
However, as we are mentioning, the informal concepts used in informal
language, are just too imprecise to allow us to judge on such issues. For
the sake of clarity, is always useful, for philosophical purposes, at least, to
present a kind of regimentation of the concepts involved, which would bring
14By the way, contrary to Quine, who claimed that there are no entities without identity
quasi-set theory shows that it can be made sense of the idea that there can exist entities
without identity. On this matter, we prefer to follow Barcan-Marcus, to whom, on the
contrary, there is no identity without entity [FK.06, p.172].
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to light the presuppositions involved in our intended use of the concepts and
which are the consequences of such use of these principles. In this sense,
we are not claiming that, once formulated classically, the idea of cardinality,
counting, and identity, are intertwined, justifying the claim that counting
requires and implies identity for the counted entities. However, given the
imprecise nature of such concepts in natural language, they may also be
formulated in distinct terms, the ones of quasi-set theory, where the kind of
relation between counting, identity and cardinality is broken. In this set-
ting, the claim holds that one may have cardinality without identity (see
also [AK.14]). So, the dispute cannot concern a preferred use of concepts in
natural language. As a matter of formulation of metaphysical theories, the
theory of non-individuals cannot be blamed to be faulty on those scores. As
we have been advancing in this paper, it can avoid the misunderstandings if
the proper conceptual distinctions are made, and quasi-set theory is a for-
mal tool helping us on that score. The problem on the dispute concerning
a metaphysics of individuals against non-individuals then, turns not on the
specific principles assumed by each view and on their coherency and consis-
tency, but rather on a dispute on the most appropriate metaphysical theory
to be chosen.
6.1 A note on multisets and fuzzy sets
The consideration of a quasi-set as something as given by equation (1) may
bring to some reader the notion of multisets [Bz.89]. At a first glance, it
may seem that the idea is quite similar to that of quasi-sets, but this is not
so, for there are important differences. A multiset is a collection of objects
that enables the repetition of the elements. So, {1, 1, 2, 3, 3} is a multiset
(mset for short) with cardinal 5, and it is not identical to its ‘support set’
{1, 2, 3} which has cardinal 3 as in standard ZFC. So, a mset can also be
represented by something like (1), but in this case all elements of a same
kind are the same object, something that does not happen in the case of
quasi-sets.15
So, we think that the claim that msets can cope with quantum objects is
not correct, for in the case of the isotope He3, no physicist will say that the
two electrons or the two protons are the same electrons or protons (‘identical’
15But notice that quasi-set theory does not say the opposite, namely, that the elements
of a same kind are all different one each other. The theory doesn’t enter in this question,
for it depends on the physical theory in consideration. In this sense, a mset may be
viewed as a particular case of a qset when identity holds for every entity and repetitions
are allowed.
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in the philosophical jargon). We have analysed this case in [K.91].
As for fuzzy sets, things are not deeply different. Roughly speaking, in
a fuzzy set we have other alternatives for an element to either belong or
not to a fuzzy set [Zd.65]. Given a standard (‘Cantorian’) set A and an
object a whatever, we have that either the object does belong to the set or
it does not belong to it (excluded middle law). This can be seen from the
point of view of the characteristic function of the set: χA(x) = 1 if x ∈ A,
and χA(x) = 0 if x /∈ A. So, the image of the function is the set {0, 1}.
Let us write x ∈0 A to say that x does not belong to A and x ∈1 A for x
belongs to A. In a fuzzy set, the image is the interval [0, 1], so we can have
x ∈k A for any k ∈ [0, 1]. Of course the extremes express the Cantorian
case, so standard sets are particular cases of fuzzy sets. But we may have
also x ∈0.3 A or x ∈0.7 A and interpret them as ‘x belonging less to A’ and
‘x belonging more to A’ respectively.
This is of course a very nice idea, as the literature has shown. But con-
cerning quantum objects, we have again a flaw in thinking that an electron,
say, may belong less to an atom than ‘another’ electron. Really, the ele-
ments of a fuzzy set still obey the classical theory of identity and hence are
individuals, presenting identity in the sense we have described before. So,
what we have here is a kind of epistemological fault, for we have no means
(which despite of this may exist) to know whether a certain element does
belong or not to a fuzzy set. The quantum case is of course different.
According to the main interpretations, that is, those which accept Bell’s
theorem which says that no local hidden variable theory can agree with
quantum mechanics, there is no way of accepting that we can supply the
theory in order to surpass such an epistemological fault and even so keep
with the classical realistic account. As J. -M. and and F. Balibar have sug-
gested [LB.96, p.69], perhaps we are in the presence of something radically
different from the objects we are accustomed with; they suggested to call
them (perhaps inspired in Mario Bunge) quantons.
7 A final remark on metaphysical choice
What we have reached, then, with our discussions on quasi-set theory, is
that one may have plausible formulations of the concepts involved in the
articulation of the RV, without them presupposing a relation with identity as
most critics suggest. What is at stake is that one may formulate the cluster
of concepts involved in articulating the RV and its rivals in distinct ways,
some of which do involve the relation between identity and cardinality (to
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stick to one example), and some of them do not. Also, some approaches to
metaphysics do conflate on purpose identity and individuality, by explaining
individuality in qualitative terms (the Leibnizian approach), and reducing
identity to indiscernibility by the set of predicates of a language. Other
approaches, however, avoid such conflation. For the purposes of the RV,
at least as typically formulated, keeping the concepts apart is the most
interesting option.
This leads us to a step back in the discussions that have been discussed so
far. The issue is not whether the theory of quasi-sets is plausible or adequate,
or whether one can use a particular concept of individuality or cardinality.
Certainly, quantum mechanics will work for most of them (not simple ver-
sions of the Leibnizian view; see French and Krause [FK.06, chap.4]). The
problem concerns metaphysical theory choice: which view to adopt. We
shall make no remarks on whether metaphysics aims at truth about reality
or just on developing beautiful theories (see Benovsky [Be.16] for further
discussion). Quantum mechanics cannot tell us which metaphysical theory
to prefer, the metaphysics of individuality gets underdetermined by the the-
ory (see also French and Krause [FK.06, chap.4]). Our purpose here was
to argue that some pre-conceptions operating on the use of concepts such
as cardinality, individuality and identity cannot rule a metaphysics of non-
individuality also. Once properly understood, such concepts may still play
the roles they are expected to play, and not get in the way of the development
of a metaphysics of non-individuality in quantum mechanics.
One could now attempt to go one step further. Given that quantum
mechanics does not allow for a straightforward Leibnizian theory of indi-
viduality, and also, given that Transcendental Individuality seems to be a
gratuitous addition over the physics, provided merely in order to satisfy some
philosophers’ needs for a principle of individuality, wouldn’t it be better just
to keep without any principle of individuality at all? This, we suggest, would
be closer to quantum mechanics, and also could be seen as a further lesson
of the theory. Quantum objects are not local (Bell’s theorem), they are
not complete (in the sense of having or else lacking every property, due to
Kochen-Specker theorem). Why not say that they also have no individu-
ality, due to permutation symmetry? Methodologically, the suggestion has
many attractions for a metaphysical naturalist, but, interesting as it is, we
shall develop it elsewhere.
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